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Abstract: In this paper, we develop a new theoretical model that explains the forest 
transition not at a local, but at a worldwide level, in a trade liberalisation scenario. Our 
model has economic geography foundations: transport costs affect the distribution of 
firms between countries. We also introduce a renewable natural resource used as an 
input by manufacturing firms. The results reproduce forest transition behaviour but at a 
global scale: a decrease in transport costs has a negative effect on the worldwide stock 
of the natural resource in the short-term, but in the long-term this initial effect is 
reversed as a consequence of industrial reorganisation between countries because of the 
change in transport costs. 
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1. Introduction 
There is an extensive literature on the effects of trade liberalisation on natural 
resources. A general conclusion might be that an increasing openness to international 
trade (basically represented by the fall in international transport costs, although changes 
in other trade policy measures are also important) increases the specialisation of 
different countries. Therefore, those with comparative advantages in resources increase 
their natural condition as suppliers of these resources to the rest, who specialise in 
industrial activities. This is the typical result of the theory of international trade: 
liberalisation leads to specialisation (complete as in Ricardo’s world or incomplete as in 
Krugman, 1980). 
Among all natural resources, the effect on forest areas has received much attention 
in the literature, see the review by Robalino and Herrera (2009). In the context of 
growing environmental concerns, the loss of forest area has emerged as a problem in 
many developed countries. The growth of economic activity requires increasing 
amounts of resources (land, timber, etc.). To the extent that they are not renewable or 
that their regeneration is relatively slow, one might expect a gradual depletion of these 
resources. 
However, recent data offer partial good news. After several decades of a 
continuous decrease in forest areas all over the world, the rates of deforestation have 
diminished in many countries over recent years. One of the key findings of the last 
Global Forest Resources Assessment (2010) was that “the rate of deforestation shows 
signs of decreasing”, although it is still high. Figure 1 shows the annual rates of change 
in the forest areas of different regions based on data from FAOSTAT. The left graph 
displays the evolution in world rates and in the rates of the Americas (North America, 
Central America, South America and the Caribbean). The Americas represented 39% of 
the worldwide forest area in 2008. We can observe that, although growth rates remain 
negative, there has been a remarkable decrease in deforestation rates both at world and 
at American levels in recent years. The right graph highlights the Brazilian case, where 
a growing evolution in rates is also observed. Brazil represented 13% of the total forest 
area in the world in 2008 and the Brazilian Amazon is one of the most important cases 
of study. Obviously, this evidence is weak as the data span considered is very short, 
only from 1990 to 2008. However, there are several papers that document this forest 
change in different areas: Finland (Myllyntaus and Mattila, 2002), India (Foster and 
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Rosenzweig, 2003), Southeastern Mexico (Bray and Klepeis, 2005), the Ecuadorian 
Andes (Farley, 2010), the Ecuadorian Amazon (Rudel et al., 2002) and Northeastern 
United States (Pfaff and Walker, 2010). 
This change in the trend from decreasing to expanding forests was defined as the 
forest transition by Mather (1992), which suggests the existence of a turning point. 
Therefore, the forest transition theory (FTT) provides a framework for explaining 
scenarios of increasing forest cover after a decreasing phase. Although in the first stage 
economic activity needs a growing volume of natural resources and this thus causes the 
depletion of forests, at some point the trend reverses, allowing the recovery of the forest 
area.1 
Many papers (Pfaff, 2000; Andersen et al., 2002; Weinhold and Reis, 2004; Pfaff 
and Walker, 2010) point to increased transport easiness (through reductions in costs or 
the liberalisation of international trade) as one of the most important causes of the 
change in this trend, as a consequence of the shift in the organisation of economic 
activity. Therefore, although the effect of a decrease in transport costs in the short-term 
is an increase in deforestation because access to the forest area becomes easier (Chomitz 
and Gray, 1996; Pfaff, 1999; Ali et al., 2005; Pfaff et al., 2007), in the long-term the 
effect on stock can be reversed because the change in transport costs induces a shift in 
the organisation of economic activity. Furthermore, this shift has multiple dimensions, 
related to relative prices, land use, increasing returns to scale or migrations. 
First, if liberalisation reduces the relative price of a resource, then a shift in 
production will occur in developed countries towards more profitable activities at the 
expense of natural resource exploitation. Second, given that agriculture is a land-
intensive activity, if the increase in trade also leads to a fall in agricultural prices, this 
will cause a shift of activity from agriculture to industry or services activities, and these 
sectors are less land-intensive (land use theory; Rudel et al., 2005). Third, the existence 
of increasing returns to scale in the manufacturing sector enhances the benefits of 
specialisation in these activities compared with the primary sector, which promotes the 
productive change. Finally, changes in the productive structure produce a concentration 
of the population through regional migrations (farm populations tend to be more 
dispersed), favouring the growth of the forest area (Carr, 2009). 
                                                           
1 The argument can also be formulated in terms of Environmental Kuznets Curves, see Pfaff and Walker 
(2010). 
  3
Other causes of this shift in forest trends (Pfaff and Walker, 2010) can include the 
growth of productivity in the agricultural sector (which reduces the pressure on arable 
land), energy diversification (which reduces energy-dependence on wood fuel) and 
changes in the preferences of individuals, increasingly concerned about the preservation 
of nature. 
However, all these reasons that support the FTT have a shortcoming, as exposed 
by Rudel et al. (2005) and Pfaff and Walker (2010). To find a reversal of the trend the 
spatial scale is crucial. Thus, if we go back to the reasons explained above, all of them 
can explain a decrease in the pressure on specific forest areas, but at the cost of moving 
the pressure to other areas. 
The productive specialisation (through international trade) that reduces the weight 
of exploitation activities in developed countries involves, by symmetry, a specialisation 
in these same activities in other countries (those with greater natural endowments, in 
our case greater forest areas). The change in land use that reduces agricultural activities 
is only possible if food imports from other countries increase, whereas in those other 
countries the change in land use is just the opposite. Furthermore, something similar 
happens to changes in environmental concerns: protectionist efforts in the closest 
geographical areas often result in greater exploitation in remote areas. In short, trade 
liberalisation boosts a forest transition in developed countries that allows an increase in 
their forest areas. But, to the extent that global resource requirements do not fall (if 
there is no technological change), this kind of transition results in the increased 
exploitation of other areas, that we can identify as developing countries (Chomitz and 
Gray, 1996; Pfaff, 1999; Ferreira, 2004; Ali et al., 2005; Pfaff et al., 2007), or even an 
increase in global exploitation (Rudel et al., 2005). Therefore, the scale of forest 
transition is only local. 
From this point of view, there are two sides to forest transition, namely the 
different effects on developed and on developing countries. In other words, the effect is 
different depending on which countries concentrate industrial activity and which 
countries have an abundance of natural resources. The forest area increases in the 
former, while it decreases in the latter (Brander and Taylor, 1997a). And here comes the 
question: is a global forest transition also possible? Although the FTT seems to suggest 
that the pressure on natural resources simply moves from some countries to others, is it 
possible that these changes also influence the aggregate level of this pressure? 
  4
Moreover, is there any reason to expect that this aggregate impact would allow the 
worldwide forest area to recover? 
Before other considerations, we acknowledge that previous arguments that 
support local forest transitions can hardly be extended to a global perspective. However, 
we can provide some additional arguments supporting a possible global forest 
transition. To this end, the analytical models of the New Economic Geography can be 
useful as they consider explicitly the role played by transport costs. Specifically, Martin 
and Rogers (1995) provide a general equilibrium framework in which the trade-off 
between economies of scale and transport costs defines the location of economic 
activity. This is the most tractable of all economic geography models (see Chapter 3 in 
Baldwin et al., 2003), which is also known as the footloose capital model. In this paper, 
we extend this analysis to consider two areas (North and South) with different natural 
endowments in order to analyse the effects of trade liberalisation not only on industrial 
location and on the concentration of economic activity between different countries, but 
also on the growth of their stocks of natural resources. Our model is able to reproduce 
the previously explained mechanisms. Thus, a reduction in transport costs has a 
negative effect on stock in the short-term, but in the long-term this initial effect is 
reversed as a consequence of the industrial reorganisation between countries because of 
the change in transport costs. 
Regarding the endowments of natural resources, we normalise one of the 
country’s endowments to zero in order to consider a completely asymmetric scenario. 
Thus, the natural resource is located only in one of the two countries, which we call 
South (strictly speaking, what we assume to be concentrated in the South is the 
exploitation of the resource; the North may have natural resources but they are not 
exploited for economic, environmental or other reasons). There are two reasons for this 
configuration. On one hand, it is an assumption that simplifies the model, and the results 
are qualitatively robust as long as we keep the relative abundance of natural resources in 
this area. On the other hand, keeping in mind that the trend observed and described by 
the FTT is a progressive specialisation of the South in natural resources exploitation, we 
consider the extreme case (the complete specialisation of the South), which should be 
the worst case for the possibility of a global forest transition. Therefore, if we obtain 
arguments supporting a global forest transition even in such an extreme scenario, the 
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same reasons may be true in a framework in which the natural resource is also exploited 
in the North. 
In related research, Jinji (2006) also investigates the effects of trade liberalisation 
on deforestation using a model with an endogenous carrying capacity of the resource. 
He finds that, against the usual result that trade liberalisation reduces forest stocks in 
countries with an abundance of this natural resource (Brander and Taylor, 1997b), trade 
liberalisation may increase the forest stock in the resource-abundant country and may 
decrease the forest stock in the resource-scarce country. Our model offers a new 
complementary perspective. Although the carrying capacity in steady state does not 
change, the long-term changes in industrial location driven by trade liberalisation finally 
result in a drop in global demand for the resource that will, in the end, allow for the 
recovery of the initial level of forest area in the country with an abundance of the 
resource. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic 
characteristics of the theoretical model. Section 3 explains the equilibrium. Section 4 
analyses the effects of trade liberalisation on natural resources through a decrease in the 
transport cost of the natural resource, distinguishing between short and long run effects. 
Finally, the work ends with the conclusions. 
2. The model 
We follow the dynamic framework proposed by Martin and Ottaviano (1999, 
2001), which is an extension of the static model originally proposed by Martin and 
Rogers (1995), although avoiding economic growth engines. This allows us to maintain 
the model’s tractability even after the inclusion of a new sector with a dynamic 
behaviour, namely the one related to the harvest of the natural resource.  
We consider two countries, North and South, which trade with each other. In a 
broad sense, we can identify the North as the industrialised country and the South as the 
natural resources owner. There are two key differences between them that determine 
this characterisation. First, the natural resource is only available in the South (we 
normalise the North’s endowment to zero). This assumption carries to the extreme the 
relative specialisation of the South in natural resources, which makes the model more 
tractable. Second, the North is more industrialised than the South, although not 
completely specialised. As we show, this is equivalent to considering that the initial 
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level of capital in the North exceeds that in the South and implies that the North is 
richer in terms of national income. 
Given that both countries share identical characteristics otherwise, we focus on 
describing the economy of the North (an asterisk denotes in what follows the variables 
corresponding to the South). Both countries are inhabited by representative households 
playing the part of consumers and workers. There are L  households, both in the North 
and in the South. Labour is mobile between sectors but immobile between countries. 
Preferences 
The preferences are instantaneously nested CES and intertemporally CES, with 
an elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to the unit: 
 ( )10 log tt tU D Y e dtα α ρ∞ − −= ∫ , (1) 
with 10 << α . ρ  denotes the intertemporal discount rate, Y  is a traditional 
homogeneous good (which we consider as the numerary good) and D  is a composite 
good that, in the style of Dixit and Stiglitz, consists of a number of different varieties of 
what we identify as manufactures: 
 σσ
11
1
0
11 −
=
− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫Ni itt diDD . (2) 
N  denotes the total number of varieties available worldwide, produced either in the 
North ( n ) or in the South ( ∗n ), with ∗+= nnN . This specification implies the 
existence of a love-of-variety effect; that is to say, the utility derived from any total 
amount of manufactures is higher the wider the set of varieties included. The parameter 
1>σ  captures the elasticity of substitution between varieties, which (for N  high 
enough) coincides with the price elasticity of demand for each variety.  
Note that the natural resource does not appear explicitly in the structure of 
individual preferences, meaning that it lacks value for consumers (it might have social 
value, which could lead a planner to decide to maintain a minimum level, but we do not 
consider this possibility). The only role of the natural resource is as an essential input in 
the industry. 
Traditional good sector 
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The numerary good is produced using only labour, subject to constant returns in a 
perfectly competitive sector. As labour is mobile between sectors, the constant returns 
in this sector tie down the wage rate w  in each country at each moment. We assume 
throughout the paper that the parameters of the model are such that the numerary is 
produced in both countries, that is, that the total demand for the numerary is big enough 
so as not to be satisfied with its production in a single country2. In this way, wages are 
constant and they are identical in both countries. A unit of labour is needed to produce a 
unit of Y , so free competition in the labour market implies that 1=w  in both countries. 
Manufacturing sector (industry) 
The different varieties of manufactures are produced using identical technologies. 
Labour )(L  and the natural resource )(R  are combined through a Cobb–Douglas-type 
technology to produce x  units of the i-th variety in the way:  
 
μμ
iii RLx
−= 1 ,  (3) 
where )1,0(∈μ  measures how intensive is the sector in the use of the natural resource.  
In order to produce a variety, a previous investment in capital is required, either 
in a physical asset (machinery) or in an intangible one (patent). The concept of capital 
K  used in this paper corresponds to a mixture of both types of investment. We assume 
that each variety is produced by one firm and that it requires one unit of capital. On one 
hand, this is a fixed cost that gives rise to scale economies; on the other, it ensures the 
firm a perpetual monopoly for the production of the corresponding variety. 
As stated above, we assume that the North is initially capital-abundant 
( ∗> KK ), so that it has the highest share of industry. The worldwide capital 
endowment is fixed (there is no economic growth). Thus, the worldwide number of 
varieties and firms is determined by the aggregate stock of capital: 
∗∗ +=+= KKnnN . Capital is mobile between countries, and there are no relocation 
costs. Once the investment in capital has been made, each firm chooses where to locate 
its production and produces the new variety in a situation of monopoly. Unlike firms, 
households are immobile and, thus, their incomes are geographically fixed, although 
firms can move. In other words, if a firm owner decides to locate production in the 
                                                           
2 The restriction on parameters for the constant returns to scale sector that exists in both countries is the 
same as in Martin and Ottaviano’s model, see Appendix A in Martin and Ottaviano (1999). 
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country where he or she does not reside, he or she repatriates the profits and that income 
is spent in the owner’s region regardless of where the capital is employed. 
Natural resource sector 
As stated above, the South is endowed with a stock of the natural resource ( )S , 
characterised as in Eliasson and Turnovsky (2004) or in Brander and Taylor (1997a, 
1997b, 1998a, 1998b). This natural resource has specific characteristics: (i) it is 
renewable, (ii) it is open-access, (iii) it is used only as an input in the production of 
manufactured goods and (iv) its exploitation requires only labour. Therefore, our model 
is specifically suited to the particular case of forest areas because a natural resource with 
such characteristics is, for example, the wood from the forests of the South. The 
Amazon forest is the best representative case. 
At any point in time, the evolution of the stock of the resource is given by  
 ( ) RSGS −=
•
,  
where ( )SG  describes the natural growth of the resource and R  is the amount 
harvested. We assume that the function G  is concave and positive in the interval [0, ]S , 
where S  is the maximum amount that the stock can reach, given the physical and 
natural limitations (e.g., available space). ( )SG  is analogous to a production function, 
with the difference that the rate of accumulation of the stock is limited (see Brown 
(2000) for a wider discussion of ( )SG  and its properties). As usual, let us particularise 
( )SG  with the logistic function: 
 ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
S
SSSG 1γ , (4) 
where 0>γ  is the intrinsic growth rate of the resource (the natural growth rate). In the 
absence of harvesting ( )0=R , S  converges to its maximum sustainable stock level, S . 
This function has been widely used in the analysis of renewable resources, and it may 
be the simplest and most empirically plausible functional form of describing biological 
growth in a restricted environment. 
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The exploitation of the natural resource requires only labour and this is carried 
out by profit-maximising firms operating under conditions of free entry. We consider a 
standard harvesting function (Schaefer, 1957): 
 RBSLR = ,  (5)  
where RL  is the amount of (Southern) labour used in the renewable resource sector and 
B  is a positive productivity parameter. This technology implies that the labour 
requirement for harvesting one unit of the resource is BS1 , higher the lower the 
available stock of the resource. 
Trade 
International trade between the two countries is costly, which we capture using 
iceberg-type transport costs (Samuelson, 1954): τ  and Rτ  units ( )1, >Rττ   of 
manufactures and natural resource, respectively, must be sent from the original country 
for each unit that arrives at the destination. That is to say, only a fraction 11 <−τ  of each 
unit of any variety of manufactures sent from one country is available for consumption 
in the other country. Similarly, the North incurs the additional transport cost associated 
with the natural resource: only a fraction 11 <−Rτ  of each unit of the natural resource 
sent from the South is available for firms in the North; obviously, this cost is not borne 
by firms located in the South since they do not have to trade the resource. From here on, 
we assume ττ ≤R : it is less costly (or, at best, equal) to transport natural resource 
compared with manufactures3. For simplicity, we adopt the usual assumption that the 
traditional good is not subject to transaction costs. 
3. Equilibrium 
Consumers 
Consumers maximise their welfare by choosing the amount consumed for every 
variety of manufactures as well as for the numerary good. For Northern consumers, 
given a current expenditure E , their problem consists of maximising the utility in Eq. 
(1), where the manufactures index D  is given by Eq. (2), subject to the budget 
constraint 
                                                           
3 The results are maintained even when transport cost for the resource is higher than that for the 
differentiated good, as long as the difference is not too great. 
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 EYdjDpdiDp
nj jjni ii
=++ ∫∫ ∗∈ ∗∈ τ . (6) 
The solution of this problem implies the following demand functions for each 
variety produced in the North ( )iD , in the South ( )jD , and for the numerary good: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) Epnpn
pD
RRR
RR
i αδτ
τ
βσ
σ
σμσμ
μσ
−∗−
−
+⋅
−=
11
1 , (7) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) Epnpn
pD
RRR
R
j αδτ
τ
βσ
σ
σμσμ
μσσ
−∗−
−−
+⋅
−=
11
1 , (8) 
 EY )1( α−= , (9) 
where Rp  is the price of the resource and 
στδ −= 1  is a parameter between 0 and 1 that 
measures the openness of trade for manufactures: 1=δ  represents a situation in which 
transport costs do not exist, while if 0=δ  trade would be impossible because of the 
high transaction costs. According to Eqs. (7)–(9), a fraction α−1  of expenditure from 
the North’s consumers is devoted to the intermediate good and the remaining fraction 
α  is shared between all varieties of manufactures, with a lower demand for the varieties 
produced in the South, which, because of transport costs, have a higher price. The 
problem and the resulting demand functions of a consumer in the South are symmetrical 
to the expressions above. 
The intertemporal optimisation of consumers implies an individual expenditure 
evolving over time depending on the difference between the interest rate and the 
intertemporal discount rate: ρ−=• rEE . Since we do not consider any growth engine 
capable of generating sustained growth in this economy, in steady state the expenditure 
will remain constant and, thus, ρ=r . 
Manufactures market equilibrium 
The use of the resource available only in the South makes manufacturing costs 
different depending on whether the firms are located in the North or in the South. From 
the technology of the production of manufactures (3), the variable cost of producing one 
unit of any variety for a representative firm located in the South is μμβ Rpw −1 , with 
( ) 11 −− −= μμ μμβ , which includes the cost of labour ( w ) and that of the natural 
resource ( Rp ). The fixed costs associated with the acquisition of the unit of capital 
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should be added to calculate the total costs of the firm. In parallel, the variable cost for a 
firm located in the North is given by ( )μμ τβ RR pw −1 . In contrast to the costs of Southern 
firms, this incorporates the transport cost for the natural resource and, thus, the variable 
cost is higher than the cost incurred by any firm located in the South. In other words, 
firms in the South enjoy a competitive cost advantage derived from the presence of the 
natural resource in their territory. 
The minimisation of costs determines the demand for labour and the natural 
resource of each firm i  located in the North as: 
 ( )( ) iRRLi xpD μτμβ −= 1 ,   ( ) iRRRi xpD 1−= μτβμ , (10) 
respectively. The corresponding demands for Southern firm are parallel except for the 
fact that they do not include transport costs. Thus, other things being equal, the natural 
resource is more costly for Northern firms and thus they will use this input less 
intensively than would the firms located in the South. Because of the symmetry among 
varieties, we drop in what follows the subindex i  indicative of the different varieties 
where it is not necessary. 
The equilibrium in the market of any variety requires that the supply satisfies 
worldwide demand, including the amount lost during transport when production and 
consumption take place in different countries. Thus, from the demands of Northern 
consumers in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) and the equivalent demands of Southern consumers, 
the equilibrium condition in the market of any variety produced in the North becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+++
−= −∗−
∗
−∗−
−
σμσμσμσμ
μσ
τδ
δ
δττβσ
σα
1111
)1(
RRRRRR
RR pnpn
E
pnpn
EpLx , (11) 
whereas for any variety produced in the South it is given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+++
−= −∗−−∗−
∗
−∗
σμσμσμσμ
μσ
δτ
δ
τδβσ
σα
1111
)1(
RRRRRR
R pnpn
E
pnpn
EpLx . (12)   
These expressions show that the amount produced of each variety depends, among other 
variables, on the geographical distribution of the income (which depends on the 
geographical distribution of capital and labour) and on the price and transport cost of the 
natural resource, as part of the costs in the sector. 
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The standard rule of monopolistic competition determines the price of any variety 
produced either in the North or in the South as a margin ( )1−σσ  over the unitary costs 
of production. Thus, the difference in costs translates to the prices of the varieties 
produced in each country, namely ( )μτσ
σβ
RR pp 1−=  in the North and 
μ
σ
σβ
Rpp 1−=
∗  in 
the South, where we have taken into account that 1=w . The higher costs borne by 
firms in the North imply a higher price for the varieties produced in the North than that 
of the varieties produced in the South: ∗> pp . 
From the above results, the operating profits of the firms are also different 
depending on their location. For any firm in the North, the operating profit is:  
 ( ) ( ) xpxppx RRRR μμ τσ
βτβπ
1−=−= , (13) 
whereas for any firm in the South, it comes given by:  
 ∗∗∗∗∗ −=−= xpxpxp RR
μμ
σ
ββπ
1
, (14) 
where x  and ∗x  are the optimum production scales of a representative firm in the North 
and in the South, respectively. 
Apart from variable costs, manufacturing firms are also subject to the fixed cost 
of the unit of capital required to start their activity. The value of any firm v  in the 
capital market is given by the present value of its future flow of profits. The usual 
arbitrage condition on capital markets implies rvv =+• π , where π  denotes operating 
profit and r  is the interest rate paid by a safe asset whose market is characterised by a 
freedom of international movements ( ∗= rr ). In steady state, the value of a firm must 
be constant; thus, rv π= .  
Capital freely moves looking for the highest nominal reward. A standard way of 
describing factor flows between countries is the following ad hoc “migration” equation 
(Chapter 3 in Baldwin et al., 2003): 
( )
N
n
N
n
N
n ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∗
•
1ππ ,    (15) 
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where Nn  represents the proportion of manufacturing firms located in the North. This 
“migration” equation represents how firms move and the speed of the adjustment; with 
this specification, transition to equilibrium is not immediate, allowing us to differentiate 
between short and long run effects, and overreaction situations are not allowed. As far 
as the profits in Eq. (13) and Eq. (14) are different, firms will tend to move to the 
country with higher profits. This geographical reallocation would take place until the 
differences disappear, then 0=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
•
N
n . Thus, in the long run equilibrium, ∗= ππ  and 
∗= vv , which implies 
  xx R
μτ=∗ .  (16) 
Applying this condition to Eq. (11) and Eq. (12) allows us to obtain the long run 
geographical distribution of manufacturing firms as a function of the geographical 
distribution of income: 
 ( ) ( ) ∗
∗
−∗− +⋅−−+⋅−= EE
E
EE
E
N
n
RR δτ
δ
δτ σμσμ 111
1 . (17) 
Northern individual income comes from labour (one unit supplied, paid at the wage rate 
1=w ) and the interest on individual investment ( LKv ) and, thus, LvKE ρ+= 1 . In 
steady state, the only difference in income between both countries is given by their 
different amounts of capital. Our assumption of a concentration of capital in the North 
implies a higher income in this country: ∗> EE . In such a context, it can be shown 
from Eq. (17) that, for any value of the rest of parameters, manufacturing firms are also 
concentrated in the North ( ∗> nn  or, equivalently, 21>Nn ). 
Moreover, using Eq. (17) we can rewrite Eq. (11) and Eq. (12) as 
         ( ) μτβσ
σα −∗ ⋅+⋅−= RR pN
EELx )1( ,   and  μβσ
σα −∗∗ ⋅+⋅−= RpN
EELx )1( , (18) 
respectively. Carrying Eq. (18) to Eq. (13) and Eq. (14), and using the expression for 
the value of the firms v , we have 
N
KE ⋅−+= ασ
α21  and 
N
KE
∗
∗ ⋅−+= ασ
α21 , with 
NK  and NK ∗  denoting the share of capital owned by the North and the South, 
respectively ( NKK =+ ∗ ; 21>NK ). Thus, from Eq. (17): 
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 ( ) ( ) σ
ασ
δτ
δ
σ
ασ
δτ σμσμ 2
12
2
12
1
1
11
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+
⋅−−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+
⋅−=
∗
−−
N
K
N
K
N
n
RR
. (19) 
This expression shows clearly the elements that incentivise the concentration of 
manufacturing firms in the North. First, the distribution of firms follows the distribution 
of capital, as noted above: the higher the Northern supremacy in the endowment of 
capital, the higher the geographical concentration of firms in this region. The reason is 
that a higher endowment of capital means higher capital rents, and a higher income 
implies a larger domestic market, which attracts more firms wanting to take advantage 
of increasing returns. This is what the literature identifies as the “home market effect”.  
Second, as the literature of economic geography emphasises, a lower transport 
cost of manufactures works against the geographical homogenisation of the economic 
activity: the higher the freedom of trade in manufactures δ , the lower the concentration 
of firms in the North. Finally, and this is the key point for our interests, it can be shown 
that the opposite role is played by the transport cost of the natural resource: a reduction 
in this cost lowers the advantage of locating in the South because of the presence of the 
natural resource and thus incentivises the location of firms to the North, favouring 
industrial concentration. Thus, given that most firms are concentrated in the North, the 
home market effect (one of the so-called “second nature” causes in the literature) acts 
centripetally, favouring the agglomeration of economic activity, while the cost 
advantage offered by the natural resource to firms located in the South, (a “first nature” 
cause) acts centrifugally. 
Natural resource market equilibrium 
The extraction of the natural resource (of an amount R ) is carried out by profit-
maximising firms operating under conditions of free entry (perfect competition). 
Therefore, from Eq. (5) the price of the resource good must equal its unit production 
cost4: 
 
BSBS
wpR
1== . (20) 
                                                           
4 Note that the assumption of open access to the resource implies that the only explicit production cost is 
labour. Otherwise, another implicit cost should be considered to be associated with a reduction in the 
capacity of the reproduction of the resource, according to Hotelling’s rule. The resource would be 
exploited only by firms with property rights in a situation of imperfect competition, making the final price 
greater than the unit cost, and generating additional income for the owners of the extractive firms.  
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The firms in the sector of the differentiated goods use the natural resource as an 
input in the production of their varieties. From Eq. (10), the demand of the natural 
resource of a representative firm of the North is ( ) xpRR 1−μτβμ , whereas the demand of 
a Southern firm is ∗− xpR
1μβμ . By aggregating the firms in the North (taking into account 
the transport cost they bear) and those in the South, the worldwide demand for the 
resource amounts to 
 ( )∗∗−− += xnnxpD RRR 11 μμ τβμ ,  (21) 
which, using the expressions in Eq. (18) can be written as  
( ) 1)1( −∗+−= RR pEELD σσαμ . Thus, taking into account Eq. (20) and the values of E  
and ∗E , the resource market equilibrium is: 
 BSLR ασ
σαμ −
−= )1(2 .  (22) 
Note that, since the price of the resource decreases with the size of the stock S , 
the opposite applies to the amount R  harvested in equilibrium. The steady state in this 
sector is reached when the amount extracted equals the capacity for the reproduction of 
the natural resource: ( ) 0=−=• RSGS . A trivial solution is 0== RS . The other 
solution is given by: 
 ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−−= BLSS ασγ
σαμ )1(21 .  (23) 
In the long run, the stock of the resource tends to be higher the higher its 
maximum sustainable value S  and the higher its natural growth rate γ . By contrast, a 
higher worldwide population L , a better efficiency in the extraction process B  or a 
higher intensity in the use of the natural resource in the production of manufactures μ  
work in the opposite direction, leading the stock of the natural resource to fall in the 
long run. Note that neither the transport costs nor the geographical distribution of 
manufacturing firms affects the sustainable stock in the long run equilibrium. 
  Figure 2 shows how convergence is produced to such a steady state level. The 
figure illustrates a situation in which at the initial stock 0S  the amount harvested R  
exceeds the natural growth of the resource ( )0SG , which leads to a progressive 
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reduction in the stock until it eventually reaches the steady state level S~ . By 
substituting Eq. (23) in Eq. (22), in such a long run situation, the quantity of the 
resource used by firms is constant and amounts to: 
 ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−−−
−= BLLSBR ασγ
σαμασ
σαμ )1(21)1(2 . (24) 
As shown by Brander and Taylor (1997a), a positive (and globally stable) steady 
state solution exists if and only if the term between brackets is positive. Graphically, 
this condition requires that the slope of the harvesting function R  is lower than the 
slope of ( )SG  in the origin, thus ensuring that they cut off at some point for a positive 
value of S . Increases in the exploitation of the resource (Eq. 5) reduce the stock in the 
long run equilibrium5.  
Labour market equilibrium 
Finally, we must take into account the labour market. Labour demand comes from 
three groups of firms: those producing manufactures, those producing the traditional 
good and those that harvest the resource in the South. According to Eq. (10), labour 
demand in the manufactures sector is given by ( )( ) xpRR μτμβ −1  for any of the n  firms 
operating in the North and by ( ) ∗− xpRμμβ 1
 
for any of the ∗n  firms located in the 
South. After substituting Eq. (18) and aggregating for all firms, the total demand in this 
sector amounts to ( ) ( )∗+−− EELσσαμ )1(1 . In the sector of the traditional good, the 
labour demand is LE)1( α−  in the North and ∗− LE)1( α  in the South – see Eq. (9). 
Finally, from Eq. (5), the labour demand in the resource sector is given by BSRLR = , 
which, taking into account Eq. (22), implies ( )∗+−= EELLR σσαμ )1( . Thus, the 
                                                           
5 However, the effect on the long run harvest depends on whether the equilibrium lies on the increasing or 
the decreasing part of the curve ( )SG . The more intuitive result corresponds to the latter: a higher 
exploitation of the resource leads in the long run to a higher extraction and a lower stock. On the 
increasing part of the curve, the final effect is a shortcut in the harvest because the stock decreases very 
quickly; even more, a higher exploitation of the resource can easily lead to its extinction (small 
movements of the function R  upwards can generate a unique steady state with 0== SR ). 
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worldwide aggregate demand for labour is )( ∗+− EELσ
ασ . With an aggregate supply 
of L2 , the equilibrium in the labour market implies ασ
σ
−=+
∗ 2EE . 
 
4. Effects of the trade liberalisation of natural resource  
Having solved the equilibrium of the model, we now focus on the main purpose of 
this paper, namely the identification of the effects of the progressive reduction in the 
transport costs on the distribution of economic activity and, more specifically, on the 
performance of natural resource availability, both in the short run and in the long run. 
A reduction in the natural resource trade cost has no immediate effect on the 
South (the firms located in this country do not bear such cost), but implies a reduction in 
the cost associated with the use of the resource by firms located in the North. This 
changes the worldwide demand for the resource, and thus its harvest and its price, as 
well as the production and the price of each variety of the manufactures – initially for 
the firms in the North, but also for the firms in the South after readjustments in 
worldwide demand. The associated change in profits would generate incentives for a 
movement from one country to the other; according to our “migration” equation (Eq. 
15), such movement would take place slowly. We identify the short run effects with the 
changes that take place before the firms can undertake the changes in location, that is to 
say, for a given distribution of manufacturing firms – the one described in the preceding 
section. Having identified the short run changes, a transition process starts in which 
some firms move their location and readjust their decisions of production and use of 
inputs. As we will see, the incentives to move mitigate along the transition and 
eventually a new steady state is reached in which the geographical distribution of the 
firms is again stable. The changes experienced in this last situation are what we identify 
as the long run effects. 
For the sake of simplicity in presentation, the equilibrium described in the 
preceding section focused mainly in the long run performance of the economy. The long 
run equilibrium is easier to characterise for two reasons. The first is that the behaviour 
of the variables is regular. Indeed, given that no economic growth engines are included, 
they become constant. This is the case, among others, for the distribution of labour, the 
scale of the manufacturing firms, the value of these firms and, related to the natural 
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resource sector, its price, the amount harvested and the stock available. The second 
reason is that the process of the reallocation of firms, which we assume is not 
immediate, has been completed in the long run, so that an additional condition applies: 
in steady state, the benefits for firms are equal independently of their location. We 
depart from such equilibrium to analyse the consequences of trade liberalisation. 
Short run effects  
Five expressions in the above section are obtained without imposing any of the 
steady state properties: in the manufactures sector, Eq. (11) and Eq. (12) indicate the 
scale of production of the different varieties that clears the markets, whereas Eq. (13) 
and Eq. (14) measure the operating profits of the firms that produce them; and in the 
natural resource sector, Eq. (21) captures the demand of the resource from the 
manufactures sector. We will use these expressions to analyse the short run effects, 
taken the geographical distributions of the firms ( *,n n ) as given. 
The most immediate effect is that a decrease in the cost of trading the natural 
resource ( 0<Rdτ ) leads to a reduction in the costs of manufacturing firms located in 
the North, which have to import the resource. This fall in production costs translates to 
lower market prices for Northern varieties. No change in costs and prices takes place in 
the case of Southern varieties. Thus, since the varieties produced in the North become 
more competitive, part of the expenditure in manufactures deviates from Southern 
varieties towards Northern varieties. As a consequence, the production of manufacturing 
firms located in the North (Eq. 11) increases, whereas that of firms in the South (Eq. 12) 
decreases. 
This demand deviation increases the operating profits of the firms located in the 
North. Since the elasticity of the demand for any variety is higher than one by 
assumption ( 1>σ ), although the price charged is lower, the demand increases more 
than proportionally, thus increasing profits in Eq. (13). By contrast, the reduction in 
demand for varieties produced in the South leads to lower profits for Southern firms 
(Eq. 14). 
Since the natural resource is an input in the manufacturing sector, the 
manufactures demand deviation after the liberalisation of trade also has an impact on 
the natural resource performance. Worldwide demand is obtained in Eq. (21). On the 
part of Southern firms, the fall in the demand for their varieties ( 0>∗ Rddx τ ) leads to 
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a parallel fall in their demand of inputs, particularly of the natural resource. The last 
addend in Eq. (21) captures this effect. On the part of the Northern firms, two effects 
apply: first, the higher demand for their varieties ( 0<Rddx τ ) requires an increased 
amount of the natural resource for their production. Second, since the amount lost in 
travel is lower, the demand in origin also lowers. The first term between brackets in Eq. 
(21) includes these two opposite effects. After some (cumbersome) algebra, it can be 
shown that the first effect dominates (again, the high elasticity of demand for 
manufactures implies that the reaction in the amount used of the resource is higher than 
the fall in its cost), and therefore the demand for the natural resource from Northern 
firms increases. 
This means that the deviation in consumers demand for manufactures towards 
Northern varieties is accompanied by a parallel deviation of the demand for the natural 
resource: it increases in firms located in the North and diminishes in the case of the 
South. Since the manufactures industry is concentrated in the North, we can conclude 
that, in the short run, worldwide demand for the natural resource increases. From Eq. 
(21),  
 ( )( )( ) 011 12 <−−−= − nxp
d
dD
RR
R
R μτδσβμτ .  
Note that such an impact on worldwide demand for the resource is higher the higher is 
the concentration of the manufactures in the North (higher n ). 
 This higher demand implies a more intensive harvest of the natural resource R , 
which lowers the stock available. In turn, since the cost of harvesting reduces as the 
stock expands, the reduction in stock increases the harvest cost and the price of the 
resource Rp . This latter effect slows down the initial increase in demand. 
In summary, the liberalisation in natural resource trade leads in the short run to a 
higher exploitation, a higher price and a reduction in the stock available of the natural 
resource. This theoretical result reproduces the empirical evidence observed in the case 
of forest areas, mentioned above in the introduction and summarised by Robalino and 
Herrera (2009). 
Transition 
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Changes in the short run move the economy away from the initial steady state 
equilibrium and initiate a succession of further changes for some time until eventually 
reaching a new steady state. We highlight the main issues. 
First, the increase in the harvest of the resource over its natural capacity of 
expansion makes the stock of the resource fall. In the absence of more forces, this 
diminishes the demand pressure (because of the increase in its price associated with a 
higher cost of harvesting) and increases the natural growth of the resource (because of 
lower congestion)6. As a result, these forces determine a progressive reduction of the 
stock, although at a slower rate over time. However, more elements are at work. 
The changes in the manufacturing sector have generated a short run edge 
between the profits of firms located in the North and those in the South, with higher 
profits in the first group ( )0>− ∗ππ . This is a clear incentive for Southern firms to 
move their plants to the North, because a change in the location of firms depends on the 
differences in profits (Eq. 15). Therefore, the transition is characterised by a movement 
of firms from the South to the North, which strengthens the concentration of 
manufactures in the North. 
On one hand, this movement of firms mitigates progressively the differences in 
profits, converging to a new steady state. On the other, it also has consequences on the 
evolution of the stock of the natural resource. As noted before, from the individual firm 
demands for the natural resource (Eq. 10) it is immediate that the firms located in the 
South use more intensively the resource in the production of manufactures compared 
with those located in the North (obviously, the opposite applies with labour). With this 
lower use of the resource in the North, the movement of some firms to this country 
implies lowering demand at a worldwide level. 
This reduction in demand for the resource (because of the reallocation of firms) 
mitigates the short run increase in demand (because of the fall in transport cost). This 
means that, over the transition, the short run effect on demand reverses, with a parallel 
reversal in the evolution of the stock of the resource. 
In short, the initial deterioration of the stock will recover over time, giving rise 
to what in the case of forests has been identified as “the forest transition”. As stated in 
                                                           
6 This is the case in the decreasing part of ( )SG . In the increasing part, the natural growth of the 
resource is reduced but to a smaller extent compared with demand, so that the same conclusions apply. 
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the introduction, many explanations can be found behind this phenomenon. The 
economic geography contribution developed in this paper lies on the different intensity 
in the use of the resource depending on the distance of firms that use the wood to the 
forest. Firms close to the resource use it more intensively. With the South being the 
main wood provider, the progressive concentration of industry in the North as a result of 
the liberalisation of trade reduces pressure on forests and contributes to a reversal of the 
initial negative effects. 
Long run effects 
Our specification allows us to go further. Although, for the matter of simplicity, 
we have not solved algebraically the transition, we can easily determine the changes in 
the new steady state. Two of these are worth highlighting. First, as a result of transition 
dynamics, it is clear that in the long run the industry becomes more concentrated in the 
North ( n  increases in the new steady state). This effect can be easily obtained through 
the expression in Eq. (19): a reduction in Rτ
 
leads to an increase in Nn .  
Second, the short run negative impact on the stock of the natural resource not 
only mitigates over time, but eventually disappears. The stock in the long run is given 
by Eq. (23), which is not affected by transport costs. Thus, in the long run the stock of 
the resource recovers to its initial size, reflecting that the initial decrease vanishes 
completely during the transition. 
5. Conclusions 
Recent empirical studies identify a tendency of some forest areas to recover after 
several periods of deforestation. The FTT provides an explanation for this behaviour 
based on factors such as relative prices, land use, migrations, transport costs or 
industrial concentration. However, the driving force behind all these factors is trade 
liberalisation. 
In general, a reduction in transport costs changes the geographical organisation of 
production and, in particular, the intensity of the exploitation of natural resources in 
specific areas. When such exploitation is reduced in one area, it allows for a 
recuperation of the stock of the resource at a local level. However, from a global point 
of view, the forces behind this process shift the pressure on natural resources from some 
areas to others. Thus, although the former experience a forest transition and a 
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recovering of the stock of the resource, at a global level the exploitation could be the 
same or even larger. 
In this paper, we developed a new theoretical model to explain the possibility of a 
forest transition not in a local area, but at a worldwide level, in a trade liberalisation 
scenario. Our model has economic geography foundations: transport costs affect the 
distribution of firms between countries. We also introduce a renewable natural resource 
used as an input by manufacturing firms, which is concentrated in a specific area, 
namely developing countries. The short-term results are in line with the empirical 
evidence in the literature: a decrease in transport cost has a negative effect on the stock 
of the natural resource. 
However, we go further by considering the industrial reorganisation between 
countries because of this change in transport cost. Concretely, trade liberalisation goes 
hand in hand with a progressive concentration of industry in developed countries. This 
industrial reallocation lowers the pressure on the natural resource and reverses the short 
run effects. As a result, in the long-term exploitation is reduced and the stock of the 
resource recovers. In our specific framework, the short run depletion of the resource 
even vanishes completely. This allows us to identify this process as a forest transition at 
a worldwide scale. 
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Figure 1. Change in forest area (annual rates of change), 1990–2008 
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Source: FAOSTAT. The Global Forest Resource Assessment (2010) is the main source 
of forest area data in FAOSTAT. Data were provided by countries for the years 1990, 
2000, 2005 and 2010. Data on intermediate years were estimated for FAO using linear 
interpolation and tabulation. 
Note: Trend curves fitted by LOcally WEighted Scatter plot Smoothing (LOWESS). 
 
Figure 2. Dynamics of the resource 
 
 
 
 
